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I. INTRODUCTION
Around 6 a.m. on November 8, 2018, Christopher Tchudi awoke to the smell
of smoke and the sound of helicopters overhead.1 Careening toward his property—
TurkeyTail Farms—in Yankee Hill, California was the state’s deadliest and most
destructive wildfire in recorded history: the 2018 Camp Fire. 2 Due to the threat of
wildfire in recent years, Christopher had become accustomed to evacuating his
farm on short notice. 3 Yet that morning he hesitated to leave his forty acres of oakdotted grassland given the distance from which the fire seemed to be burning. 4
Wind gusts in the nearby canyon soon reached sixty miles per hour, spreading the
flames at a rate covering eighty football fields of land area per minute.5 The Butte
County Sheriff soon arrived at TurkeyTail Farms and told Christopher to pack
what he could as quickly as possible and evacuate. 6 Christopher heeded the
warning and escaped safely with most of his animals.7 Upon his return, Christopher
found embers had landed on his unfinished tar paper roof and completely destroyed
his home.8
1. Telephone Interview with Christopher Tchudi, Local Farmer, TurkeyTail Farms (May 25, 2020) (notes
on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. See Facts + Statistics: Wildfires, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statisticswildfires (last visited June 13, 2020, 12:42 PM) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (tallying
eighty-five lives lost, over 18,000 structures destroyed—including the vast majority of the entire town of Paradise,
California—and between $8.5–$10.5 billion in insured losses).
3. See Tchudi, supra note 1 (stating that on three prior occasions Christopher had prepped his farm for
evacuation due to approaching wildfires).
4. Id.
5. Priyanka Boghani, Camp Fire: By the Numbers, PBS: FRONTLINE (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/camp-fire-by-the-numbers/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review); see generally NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, RULE 1: THE FIELD (2011), available at
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/rulebook/pdfs/4_Rule1_The_Field.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing how an American NFL football field is “a rectangular field,
360 feet in length and 160 feet in width”—equaling an area 57,600 feet square—including endzones).
6. Tchudi, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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TurkeyTail Farms is in a region the California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection (“Cal Fire”) deems a “high-risk fire hazard severity zone.”9 These
regions are also home to the wildland-urban interface (“WUI”), “the area where
structures and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped
wildland.”10 The WUI is among the most difficult land to protect against and
suppress wildfire. 11 Fire risk in California has ignited in recent years—growing
five-fold since the 1970s.12 As of 2019, California is home to over two-million
properties at high-to-extreme risk of wildfire and ranks first in the nation for atrisk properties.13 The Camp Fire was the most destructive and deadliest of these
wildfires to date, almost completely destroying the town of Paradise, California. 14
The shocking imagery of wildfire destruction to Californian’s homes and
properties, like TurkeyTail Farms, has increased pressure on the California
Legislature to devise solutions.15 In recent years, California lawmakers have
entertained many different ideas to solve this wildfire crisis. 16 The most recent
attempt—SB 474—sought to mitigate this substantial risk with a broad, top-down
approach.17 The bill, had it passed, would have instituted a ban on all residential

9.
See Cal. State Geoportal, California Fire Hazard Severity Zone Viewer, CA.GOV,
https://gis.data.ca.gov/app/CALFIRE-Forestry::california-fire-hazard-severity-zone-viewer (last visited May 31,
2020, 9:34 AM) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (deeming this region high-risk is based
upon several factors which Cal Fire considers, such as: fuel, slope, and fire weather).
10. BUTTE CTY., BUTTE COUNTY COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLAN 15 (2015-2020 ed. 2015);
Kimiko Barrett, Reducing Wildfire Risk in the Wildland-Urban Interface: Policy, Trends, and Solutions, 55
IDAHO L. REV. 3, 15 (2019).
11. See JENNIFER GIAMBATTISTA, A PRIMER: CALIFORNIA’S WILDLAND FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 13–
14
(Legislative
Analyst’s
Office,
2005),
available
at
https://lao.ca.gov/2005/fire_protection/051205_fire_protection.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (listing factors which complicate fire prevention and suppression, such as: (1) dry conditions; (2) high
winds; (3) sparse population; and (4) development presence which hinders prescribed burning).
12. See Robinson Meyer, California’s Wildfire’s are 500 Percent Larger Due to Climate Change,
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/07/climate-change-500-percentincrease-california-wildfires/594016/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that “[s]ince
1972, California’s annual burned area has increased more than five[-]fold”).
13. See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 2 (listing the number of at risk properties within the “Top 10 States At
High To Extreme Wildfire Risk:” (1) California: 2,019,800; (2) Texas: 717,800; (3) Colorado: 371,100; (4)
Arizona: 237,900; (5) Idaho: 175,000; (6) Washington: 160,500; (7) Oklahoma: 153,400; (8) Oregon: 151,400;
(9) Montana: 137,800; (10) Utah: 136,000).
14. Boghani, supra note 5.
15. See Annie Lowrey, California is Becoming Unlivable: The State is Plagued by Two Major Issues:
Wildfires and Lack of Affordable Housing: Each Problem Exacerbates The Other, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/can-california-save-itself/601135/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting that the high housing cost crisis drives WUI development,
which in conjunction with climate change, increases wildfire’s impact on humans).
16. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51189 (amended by SB 190) (requiring the Office of the State Fire Marshal
to create a state-sponsored fund to assist with defensible space creation on private lands); AB 3164, 2019 Leg.,
2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended May 4, 2020 but not enacted) (aiming to create a “wildland-urban
interface wildfire risk model” to educate Californians); infra Section IV.D (discussing the failed bills AB 1516
and SB 739).
17. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (banning all “residential . . . commercial, retail, or
industrial” development on high fire risk land throughout the state).
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and commercial development across large areas of the state. 18 But the ban reached
too far into local government’s zone of responsibility and, more importantly,
violates fundamental private property rights.19 Further, SB 474 ignored the reality
that different regions of the state have different levels of wildfire preparedness,
capacity for compliance, and development needs. 20 While SB 474 reflected a
legitimate fear of wildfire, it lacked a clear vision for comprehensive solutions and
would have created more problems than it solved.21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Property and wildland fire protection in California is dependent upon the
efforts of multiple agencies—often with overlapping authority.22 Utilizing both
statutory and regulatory authority, California has assembled a patchwork
methodology for combating wildfires and often taps local resources. 23 State
authorities create generally applicable minimum firesafe standards that cities and
counties are free to supplement with more specific and rigorous local fire codes. 24
Yet both the U.S. and California Constitutions limit the reach of a state or local
agency authority to employ certain land use regulations. 25 Moreover, individual
property owners have specific statutory obligations to maintain their land in ways
that limit the risk of wildfire.26
Section A highlights California’s tiered-land categorization system between
federal, state, and local authorities.27 Section B identifies the two main California
state agencies the Legislature tasked with administering state-managed wildfire
policy.28 Section C discusses the role of local agencies in establishing their own
wildfire management policies—despite ever-increasing state government
18. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“a new development shall not be created or approved
in a very high fire hazard severity zone or a state responsibility area.”).
19. See infra Sections IV.A–B (arguing there are considerable federalism and Takings Clause implications
of such a sweeping land development prohibition).
20. See infra Sections IV.C–D (discussing the inherently local nature of different regions of the state in
measuring wildfire preparedness).
21. See infra Sections IV.A–D (asserting constitutional and practical reasons why a land development ban
would be unwise and potentially ineffectual).
22. GIAMBATTISTA, supra note 11, at 5.
23. See id. (“This integration is authorized by statute and is guided by interagency agreements under which
[Cal Fire] provides services to local and/or federal agencies, and vice versa” all “in order to avoid duplication of
firefighting resources and to allow the closest available resources to respond to a fire, regardless of jurisdiction”).
24. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51175(c) (West 2020) (“[I]t is not the intent of the Legislature in enacting
this chapter to limit or restrict the authority of a local agency to impose more restrictive fire and public safety
requirements, as otherwise authorized by law.”).
25. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 633 (Carolina Acad. Press, 4th ed. 2016)
(“At some point, regulation may so restrict an owner’s rights as to become a taking—thus requiring payment of
compensation.”); see also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all
local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”).
26. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4291 (West 2020).
27. Infra Section II.A.
28. Infra Section II.B.
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encroachment.29 Section D outlines Fifth Amendment implications of a
development prohibition on private land by discussing the pivotal Supreme Court
cases at issue.30 Section E discusses recent, promising legislative attempts to
manage California’s wildfire policy.31
A. Carving up California: The Overlapping Nature of Wildfire Regulation
California does not have a single, statewide wildfire policy.32 Instead, a mix of
federal, state, and local authorities categorize and regulate all land within the
state.33 Respectively, these areas are federal responsibility areas, state
responsibility areas (“SRAs”), and local responsibility areas (“LRAs”). 34
California contains roughly 101 million acres of land.35
Federal agencies own, manage, and regulate nearly half of California’s land
mass—roughly forty-eight million acres. 36 Given the mix of federal agencies that
regulate these lands, the wildfire policies vary considerably.37 Generally, federal
agencies manage wildfire policy solely within their landholding’s borders, leaving
the State of California to manage its own landholdings.38
The state government administers wildfire policy for the SRAs, which
comprise roughly thirty-one million acres of predominantly privately owned, highrisk land.39 Local authorities regulate California’s remaining twenty-two million
acres as LRAs.40 Both SRAs and LRAs contain “high-risk” lands, but the state can
only assume control over a high-risk region within an LRA with the local
government’s approval.41

29. Infra Section II.C.
30. Infra Section II.D.
31. Infra Section II.E.
32. See TAYLOR O. MILLER ET AL., CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & LAND USE PRACTICE § 80.03
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 1, 2 (2020) (outlining the multiplicity of agency authority over California’s
wildlands, including, the federal, state, and local agencies operating within California’s borders).
33. See GIAMBATTISTA, supra note 11, at 1 (highlighting the fragmented nature of California land
categorization).
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id. at 1.
36. See id. at 3 (discussing the various federal agencies which manage wildfire policy on their respective
landholdings in California: the United States Forest Service; the Bureau of Land Management; Fish and Wildlife
Service; Bureau of Indian Affairs; the Department of Defense; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation).
37. See id. at 4 (noting that some agencies pursue a suppression strategy almost entirely, while others
permit burns to increase resource values).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1.
40. Id.
41. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 51178–51179 (West 2020) (outlining the interplay between state and local
authorities whereby the State Director of Forestry and Fire Protection identifies areas which ought to be “very
high fire hazard severity zones” and recommends their inclusion into the state’s regulatory framework. But this
inclusion is dependent upon local agency approval, disapproval, or modification).
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B. California’s Administrative Apparatus for Wildfire Management: The Board
of Forestry & Cal Fire
In general, two state agencies promulgate and administer California wildfire
policy: The Board of Forestry and Fire Protection (“Board”) and Cal Fire. 42 The
Board sets general wildfire policy and development standards for the SRAs.43
Further, the Board plays a role—secondary to local governments—in deciding
which land becomes an SRA.44
Cal Fire conducts prescribed burns, vegetation management, insect and disease
control, and—most importantly—fire suppression.45 In response to the escalating
severity of wildfires, Cal Fire has consistently allocated increasing amounts of
emergency funding toward suppression costs. 46 Meanwhile, Cal Fire’s annual
expenditures toward preemptory fire preparedness have consistently decreased. 47
C. The Tension Between State and Local Governments in Managing The Threat
of Wildfire
The California Constitution empowers local governments with broad
authority.48 The Legislature has recognized the Board’s limited wildfire policy

42.
Mark V. Thornton, General History of Cal Fire, CAL FIRE (June 15, 2020),
https://www.fire.ca.gov/about-us/history/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
43. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, ch. 7 (2016) (outlining the Board’s minimum firesafe standards
for: (1) defensible space requirements; (2) signing and building numbering; (3) emergency water access; and (4)
fuel modification); MILLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 2.
44. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4125 (West 2020) (“The board shall include within state responsibility
areas all of the following lands: (a) Lands covered wholly or in part by forests or by trees producing or capable
of producing forest products. (b) Lands covered wholly or in part by timber, brush, undergrowth, or grass, whether
of commercial value or not, which protect the soil from excessive erosion, retard runoff of water or accelerate
water percolation, if such lands are sources of water which is available for irrigation or for domestic or industrial
use. (c) Lands in areas which are principally used or useful for range or forage purposes, which are contiguous to
the lands described in subdivisions (a) and (b).”).
Id.; see also GOV’T § 51179 (West 2020) (requiring local agency acquiescence when the state seeks to assume
control over “high-risk” lands).
45. MILLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 3.
46. See generally CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROTECTION, EMERGENCY FUND FIRE SUPPRESSION
EXPENDITURES (2019), available at https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/8641/suppressioncostsonepage1.pdf (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing massive increases in emergency fire suppression
expenditures year after year); see generally GIAMBATTISTA, supra note 11, at 15 (“When a fire escapes ‘initial
attack,’ the cost of fire suppression can rise quickly. This is because these fires often require large numbers of
personnel and equipment, aviation support, lodging and meal costs, and overtime.”).
47. See GIAMBATTISTA, supra note 11, at 9 (showing fire prevention expenditures in 2004–2005 as less
than five percent of Cal Fire’s total expenditures); see also Jim Miller, Why Isn’t California Spending Millions in
Fire
Prevention
Money?,
TRIBUNE
NEWS
SERV.
(Oct.
5,
2015),
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/millions-of-dollars-in-california-fireprevention-money-goes-unspent2.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing tens of
millions of dollars left unspent from Cal Fire’s fire prevention fund in 2015).
48. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police,
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”).
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mandate, which does not include “[l]ands within the exterior boundaries of any
city.”49 Therefore, if local agencies in the SRAs meet minimum Board standards
for firesafe development, those agencies may regulate above those standards.50
Within city boundaries, local agencies have even broader control over their zoning
and fire regulation—as long as local laws do not conflict with general state laws.51
Such a conflict exists if the local regulation “duplicates, contradicts or enters an
area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative
implication.”52
California statutes and local ordinances acknowledge local power to regulate
wildfire policy.53 Yet the same statutes that acknowledge local regulatory power
also outline the encroaching nature of state authority into wildfire policy. 54 Despite
these efforts toward preemption, localities have historically maintained
considerable latitude when administering most aspects of wildfire preparedness in
their jurisdictions. 55 The state merely sets broadly written minimum safeguards to
provide a regulatory foundation for fire preparedness across the state. 56 Yet when
specific needs arise, local governments regulate more precisely to manage the
details.57

49. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4127(b) (West 2020) (declaring “[l]ands within the exterior boundaries of
any city, except a city and county with a population of less than 25,000” as outside the Board’s authority).
50. CAL. CODE REGS tit. 14, § 1270.04 (2016).
51. Christine Dietrick, Land Use 101: A Field Guide, CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO 2 (2015),
https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Member-Engagement/Professional-Departments/CityAttorneys/Library/2015/Land-Use-101-Webinar-Paper.aspx (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
52. Viacom Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Arcata, 140 Cal. App. 4th 230, 236 (2006).
53. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51179 (West 2020) (allowing for local agencies to refute, override a lack of,
or accept Director of Forestry recommendations on land classification relating to designations for “high-risk”
areas); see also PUB. RES. § 4291 (allowing for local agencies to provide stronger regulatory measures than the
minimum safeguards created by the Board).
54. See GOV’T § 51179 (providing for authority vested in the Director of the Board of Forestry to
recommend land within a local agency’s purview to be categorized as “high-risk” and therefore subject to state
regulation); see also PUB. RES. § 4291 (allowing the Director of the Board of Forestry to “vary the requirements”
for both building codes and vegetation removal within LRAs).
55. See Edith Hannigan, Using Pre-Disaster Community Capacity to Address Land Use Post-Wildfire, 55
IDAHO L. REV. 29, 49 (2019) (noting the three primary local agency regulatory hurdles for landowners in building
on parcels at risk of fire: (1) “permitting fees; (2) debris removal; and (3) navigating the governmental systems
to accomplish rebuilding”).
56. See Sameer Ponkshe, Municipal Wildfire Management in California: A Local Response to Global
Climate Change, 32 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 600, 630 (2015) (“While the [S]tate of California promulgates its own
building code, municipalities are authorized to enact more restrictive building standards so long as they can
establish that ‘modifications or changes are reasonably necessary because of local climatic, geological or
topographical conditions.’”) (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17958.7 (West 2020)).
57. See BUTTE CTY., supra note 10 (highlighting how minimum state standards are essential, yet going on
to describe the specific needs of fire preparedness for Butte County residents, including: (1) preventing soil
erosion; (2) maintaining water quality; (3) protecting timberlands valued at around $2.5 billion; (4) safeguarding
hydroelectric power facilities; and (5) prescribed burning); see also Ponkshe, supra note 56, at 611–26 (outlining
several examples of differing municipal fire code regulations, based on differing needs, from various localities in
California).
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D. Problems with Prohibition: The Takings Clause and Land Use Regulation
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the state shall not
take “private property . . . for public use without just compensation.”58 While the
Takings Clause initially applied only to the federal government, ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment and key Supreme Court rulings incorporated the Takings
Clause to state and local governments.59 Governmental takings of tangible, private
property are uncommon in the U.S.60 However, land use regulation has become
quite common.61 In the past century, the Supreme Court has responded to these
trends by issuing several key holdings on American Takings Law.62 Subsection 1
addresses the foundational zoning decision, Euclid, which identifies the acceptable
goals of such regulation.63 Subsection 2 discusses Penn Central and its balancing
test for determining if a government has engaged in a taking.64 Finally, subsection
3 details the Lucas holding that inhibition of economic use of property may
constitute a taking.65
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
Euclid is the Supreme Court’s seminal regulatory takings case. 66 The Court
held that zoning laws are valid unless they are “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”67 Courts now refer to this test as the rational basis test, which gives
strong deference to a state or local government’s regulation.68

58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. See SPRANKLING, supra note 25, at 696 (highlighting the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as
applicable to the state and local governments) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897) (incorporating the 5th Amendment’s Takings Clause to the states via the Due Process clause of
the 14th Amendment)).
60. See Kemberly M. Watt, Eminent Domain, Regulatory Takings, and Legislative Responses in the PostKelo Northwest, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 539–40 (2007) (citing American polling data from 2005 indicating “that
over sixty percent of registered voters want to limit the power of eminent domain” and “[t]wenty six states have
passed legislation to limit the power of eminent domain”).
61. See A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT 6 (ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING 1923) (“Such
regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the
streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare.”).
62. See SPRANKLING, supra note 25, at 696–711, 714–19 (outlining the early era of Supreme Court
regulatory takings jurisprudence, through its evolution in the mid-20th century, into the modern era).
63. Infra Subsection II.D.1.
64. Infra Subsection II.D.2.
65. Infra Subsection II.D.3.
66. SPRANKLING, supra note 25, at 633.
67. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
68. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND COLLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 814 (4th
ed. 2018).
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2. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
In Penn Central, the Court determined if New York City’s regulation
inhibiting Penn Central from modernizing a historic landmark was a taking.69 To
determine whether a land use regulation constitutes a taking, the Court created a
factored balancing test.70 The first factor is the economic impact on the claimant.71
The second factor is the relevant regulation’s interfering effect upon a claimant’s
“investment-backed expectations.”72 Finally, the Court identified the nature of the
governmental intrusion as the third factor of the inquiry.73
3. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In Lucas, the petitioner paid almost one million dollars for two residential lots
on the Isle of the Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina.74 The South
Carolina General Assembly subsequently enacted the Beachfront Management Act
that prohibited “erecting any permanent habitable structures” on parcels near
beaches experiencing erosion.75 The Court created a bright line rule, finding a
taking “where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically
beneficial uses” of land.76
E. Fire Prevention: Alternative Approaches That California Has Considered
In recent years, despite offering tangible assistance to local agencies and
individuals, several legislative attempts to increase fire preparedness have failed. 77
Assembly Bill 1516 sought to “make various changes to vegetation clearance
requirements” and implement a state-run “pilot volunteer training program” to
assess properties’ fire preparedness. 78 The Legislature passed this bill, but it failed
upon Governor Gavin Newsom’s subsequent veto.79

69. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
70. Id. at 124.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1018.
77. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51189 (amended by SB 190) (requiring the Office of the State Fire Marshal
to create a state-sponsored fund to assist with defensible space creation on private lands); see also AB 3164, 2019
Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended May 4, 2020 but not enacted) (aiming to create a “wildland-urban
interface wildfire risk model” to educate Californians); infra Section IV.D (discussing the anticipated impacts of
both AB 1516 and SB 739, respectively).
78. Hearing on SB 739 Before the S. Rules Comm., 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) [hereinafter
SB 739 Rules Hearing] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
79. Id.
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Another recent approach to fire preparedness was Senate Bill 739.80 This bill
focused entirely on fire prevention training.81 The training program’s chief goal
was to “support and augment” defensible space and increase “home hardening
assessment and education efforts.” 82 Further, this bill sought to “empower
communities to protect themselves” and save “Cal Fire time and money” by
outsourcing fire preparedness inspections to volunteer citizens. 83
III. SB 474
SB 474 sought to ban land development within all SRAs and high-risk fire
zones within LRAs.84 The bill declared that “development within a zone of high
fire danger . . . is a matter of statewide concern and is not a municipal affair.” 85
This prohibition would have broadly applied to an individual’s creation of new
structures and also local agencies’ approval of such projects. 86 SB 474 had uniform
applicability to all cities and charter cities within California that administer highrisk land.87 SB 474 also would have prohibited development for residential,
commercial, retail, and industrial building projects. 88 As a “state-mandated local
program,” this law would have imposed enforcement responsibilities upon local
governments.89
IV. ANALYSIS
The Legislature’s attempt at a development ban was a response to everincreasing wildfire risk. 90 Californians continue to flock to the WUI, increasing

80. See SB 739, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Jan. 15, 2020, but not enacted)
(aiming to establish a pilot training and awareness program for fire preparedness).
81. SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“a new development shall not be created or approved
in a very high fire hazard severity zone or a state responsibility area.”).
85. Id.
86. See id. (“a new development shall not be created or approved in a very high fire hazard severity zone
or a state responsibility area.”).
87. Id.; see LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, CHARTER CITIES: A QUICK SUMMARY FOR THE PRESS AND
RESEARCHERS
(2007),
https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-Section/CharterCities/Charter-Cities-A-Quick-Summary-for-the-Press-and-R (“The California Constitution gives cities the
power to become charter cities. The benefit of becoming a charter city is that charter cities have supreme authority
over ‘municipal affairs.’ In other words, a charter city’s law concerning a municipal affair will trump a state law
governing the same topic.”) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a)) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
88. SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
89. Id.
90. See Meyer, supra note 12 (“The past decade has seen half of [California’s] 10 largest wildfires and
seven of its 10 most destructive fires, including [the 2018] Camp Fire, the state’s deadliest wildfire ever.”).
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suppression demand on Cal Fire in such high-risk regions.91 But a “broad swath”
ban undermines both local agency autonomy and basic property rights—inhibiting
otherwise lawful uses of land.92 Also, SB 474 would have further exacerbated
California’s budgetary shortfalls by likely imposing regulatory takings that would
have required the state to pay “just compensation” to private landowners.93 Finally,
California wildfire policy is diffuse by design, and this ban did not account for
nuance, inhibited creative solutions, and would have left many Californian’s
problems unaddressed.94
Section A explains the manner in which SB 474 would have upended local
agency power to develop flexible wildfire policy. 95 Section B outlines the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence and liability SB 474 would have
created for the State of California. 96 Section C addresses the reality of California’s
wildfire protection scheme—one that is suppression-minded above all else—and
the benefits of becoming more prevention-minded.97 Finally, Section D describes
the multi-faceted nature of wildfire preparedness and how other bills sought to
address the complexity of the current crisis. 98
A. The Police Power: How SB 474 Would Have Undermined Local Agency
Autonomy and Prevented Nuanced Solutions
Deeply ingrained in the American political tradition is the notion of
federalism—the provision of limited autonomy to smaller geographical locales of
the nation for handling regional matters. 99 Alexander Hamilton pragmatically
noted that “the variety of more minute interests . . . will necessarily fall under the
superintendence of local administrations.”100 The U.S. Constitution’s Tenth
Amendment reflects this theoretical framework, leaving the resolution of regional
matters to state and local governments.101 The California Constitution furthers this
91. See CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROTECTION, supra note 46 (showing the scale of increases in
Cal Fire’s emergency fire suppression expenditures since 1979).
92. SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78.
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
94. See infra Part IV (discussing several practical shortfalls to a broad development ban).
95. Infra Section IV.A.
96. Infra Section IV.B.
97. Infra Section IV.C.
98. Infra Section IV.D.
99. MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC
COMPROMISE 69 (2008).
100. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or
diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each [s]tate would be apt to feel
a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the government of the Union.
Id.
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
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concept of reducing power to the most local level possible.102 Such local regulatory
schemes—which courts have termed the police power—are “an indispensable
prerogative of sovereignty and one that is not to be lightly limited.”103
California gives its municipalities “the maximum degree of control” to
regulate their own regional zoning matters. 104 Supplementing minimum state
standards, most local agencies have already laid a foundation for fire
preparedness.105 If these local regulatory codes are to exist at all, they must be more
stringent than the minimum state standards.106 Yet these codes, admittedly, have
not prevented the current wildfire crisis. 107
Under the paradigm SB 474 sought to create, any local attempt to regulate
construction in high-risk zones would have been inherently less stringent than an
all-out ban.108 Thus, state preemption in this area would have inhibited any local
wildfire policy development related to zoning and building—essential elements to
wildfire preparedness. 109 Further, the state would have assumed responsibility for
all building and zoning decisions in new areas—increasing state costs. 110
The ban would have unquestionably applied to the initial construction of
virtually any structure. 111 The bill even sought to prevent a landowner from placing

prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”).
102. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed thereunder may make and enforce all
ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in
their several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws . . . . City charters adopted
pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall
supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.
Id.
103. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 383 (Cal. 1925).
104. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65800 (West 2020).
105. See Ponkshe, supra note 56, at 612–26 (outlining several examples of municipal fire code regulations
from various localities in California, including: (1) Chino; (2) Morgan Hill; (3) Richmond; (4) Cathedral City;
(5) Arroyo Grande; and (6) Rancho Santa Margarita and noting many of these municipal efforts as “accurate and
effective”).
106. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51175(c) (West 2020) (“It is not the intent of the Legislature in enacting this
chapter to limit or restrict the authority of a local agency to impose more restrictive fire and public safety
requirements, as otherwise authorized by law.”); see id. at 630 (“While the State of California promulgates its
own building code, municipalities are authorized to enact more restrictive building standards so long as they can
establish that “modifications or changes are reasonably necessary because of local climatic, geological or
topographical conditions.”).
107. See Ponkshe, supra note 56, at 631 (calling for municipalities to “enac[t] stricter building standards
. . . as the threat of wildfire rises”).
108. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (inhibiting local governments from approving any
development projects).
109. See NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CTR. FOR CITY SOLUTIONS, CITY RIGHTS IN
AN
ERA
OF
PREEMPTION:
A
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS,
1
(2018),
available
at
https://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[P]reemption that prevents cities from expanding rights,
building stronger economies and promoting innovation can be counterproductive and even dangerous.”).
110. See Id. (“[P]reemption creates a problem, though, because it means a loss of local control for cities.”).
111. SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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a mobile home on a property.112 But SB 474 also seemed to apply to a property
owner seeking to update an existing structure using firesafe materials—as should
be the goal with all WUI homes.113 Specifically, the law prohibited any new
“development,” which it defined as: “[a] project containing residential
dwellings.”114 For example, an owner may seek to replace the roof or walls of a
home with firesafe components, such as “composition, metal, or tile.”115 That
renovation would seem to be a “project containing [a] residential dwellin[g],”
which would have been potentially unlawful. 116 Another likely scenario
highlighting the problematic nature of the ban is an owner hoping to demolish an
outdated, non-firesafe structure and replace it with an updated building.117 SB 474
not only disincentivized but prohibited a landowner from bringing a property into
compliance with existing, fire-conscious building methods.118 Furthermore,
localities would have been crippled in their capacity to oversee such improvements
and development.119
In effect, SB 474 would have worked against its purported purpose.120 The bill
aimed to bar initial projects, reconstruction, and perhaps even some necessary
retrofitting and modernization.121 Essentially, this development prohibition would
have negated local government’s role in regulating any development
whatsoever.122 Undeniably, “only the most prepared and secure development”
should take place in California’s WUI. 123 However, merely pressing pause on an
untenable status quo prevents localities from updating codes to conform with the

112. Id.
113. See id. (prohibiting all development, defined as: “[a] project containing residential dwellings,
including, but not limited to, mobilehomes, accessory dwelling units, and junior accessory dwelling units, of one
or more units or a subdivision of land for the purpose of constructing one or more residential dwelling units”);
Low Cost Retrofit List, READY FOR WILDFIRE, http://www.readyforwildfire.org/wp-content/uploads/Low-costRetrofit-List-Final.pdf (last visited Jul. 14, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(providing an extensive list of home hardening retrofitting materials, recommendations, and tactics).
114. SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
115. Hardening Your Home, READY FOR WILDFIRE, https://www.readyforwildfire.org/prepare-forwildfire/get-ready/hardening-your-home/ (last visited Jul. 14, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
116. SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
117. See Dana Goodyear, Building for Resilience in California’s Fire-Prone Future, THE NEW YORKER
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/building-for-resilience-in-californias-fireprone-future (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the need for Californian’s to
develop more firesafe homes including unique approaches: such as: (1) metal doors; (2) water storage tanks; and
(3) NASA-developed flame-retardant coatings applied to exterior walls).
118. SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
119. See id. (prohibiting creation or approval of development projects on high risk land and stating that
this is no longer a “municipal affair”).
120. See infra Section IV.C (emphasizing that such a sweeping prohibition leaves unaddressed physical
realities on the ground that drastically increase wildfire risk).
121. SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
122. See id. (providing that regulating development on high fire risk land is now a “statewide concern”).
123. Ponkshe, supra note 56, at 631.
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evolving science on adequate fire prevention—as is their role.124 Further, SB 474
ignored homeowners with outdated homes, and would have left them without a
responsive and flexible local government to help them modernize. 125
B. Another Problem with Prohibition: The Takings Clause
SB 474 would have created new liability for the State of California under the
U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.126 First, SB 474’s goals
were surely well-intentioned and even legitimate under a Euclid analysis.127 Yet,
this development prohibition aimed to “g[o] too far,” perhaps leading many
landowners to seek just compensation in California courts. 128
Subsection 1 applies the Euclid analysis—whether the prevention of wildfire
is a rational state goal—to California’s development prohibition.129 Subsection 2
analyzes SB 474 under Penn Central’s multi-factor balancing test to determine
whether it would have been a taking.130 Finally, Subsection 3 explores the extent
to which SB 474 would have inhibited all “economically beneficial use” of
property under Lucas.131
1. The Euclid Test: A Rational Connection
Admittedly, SB 474 had a rational relation to the public health, safety, and
welfare.132 While the ban met minimum constitutional standards for validity, it
would still have faced other constitutional issues.133 SB 474’s prohibition was the
Legislature’s reaction to unprecedented levels of wildfire destruction in
California—including both loss of life and property damage. 134 Recent Cal Fire
124. See id. (“[I]t is vital that even the lowest levels of government are legally positioned and poised to
protect their constituency from disaster.”).
125. See Hannigan, supra note 55, at 49 (arguing that only by building “community capacity” between
local government actors and community leaders can WUI residents adequately prepare for wildfires). See
generally Barrett, supra note 10, at 3 (noting the multi-faceted approach to municipal zoning for wildfire,
including: (1) plans; (2) regulations; (3) building codes; and (4) incentives).
126. See infra Subsections IV.B.2–3 (arguing that such a sweeping prohibition on individual private
property rights would constitute a taking under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
127. See infra Subsection IV.B.1 (outlining the Euclid test’s low standard for constitutional validity—a
mere rational connection to a legitimate public purpose).
128. See infra Subsections IV.B.2–3 (arguing that under Penn Central and the Lucas tests, SB 474 would
have required the State of California to pay just compensation to many affected landowners).
129. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
130. Infra Subsection IV.B.2.
131. Infra Subsection IV.B.3.
132. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (“Catastrophic and devastating wildfires have occurred
repeatedly in the state in recent years. For example, from the 2017 through the 2019 statewide fire season, over 3
million acres burned in high-severity wildfires resulting in the tragic loss of over one hundred lives, and thousands
of structures being destroyed.”).
133. See infra Subsections IV.B.2–3 (discussing the ramifications of SB 474 under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holdings in Penn Central and Lucas).
134. Meyer, supra note 12.
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inspection reports indicate massive shortfalls in both total property inspections and
homes that meet defensible space criteria. 135 With more than two million properties
on over twenty-five million acres of high-risk land, the desire to cut off any further
development is understandable.136 The data show that, especially in recent years,
state and local wildfire agencies have unsuccessfully suppressed and inadequately
prepared for these massive fires. 137 The state can easily show a substantial relation
between extreme wildfire destruction and a development ban serving the ends of
preserving life, property, and the public purse. 138 On its face, SB 474 met the bare
minimum standards for constitutional validity under Euclid.139
2. Regulatory Takings: The Penn Central Test
SB 474’s “economic impact” on potential California claimants would have
varied widely.140 A development ban would have prohibited landowners from
rebuilding wildfire-destroyed homes.141 This prohibition would have potentially
forced many homeowners to live elsewhere after a wildfire—incurring significant
costs—while drastically reducing their land’s value.142 For example, the Camp Fire
in Butte County displaced approximately 50,000 people from their homes. 143 The
neighboring City of Chico experienced a massive influx of new residents seeking
housing, which increased property values by over 30%.144 While these market
changes created a boon for existing homeowners with unscathed properties, the
displaced faced serious financial headwinds on their way to recovery.145

135. See Hearing on SB 739 Before the S. Comm. on Nat. Res. and Water, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess.
(Cal. 2020) [hereinafter SB 739 Nat. Res. Hearing] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(“According to a review by a news organization of almost 500,000 defensible space inspection records, CAL
FIRE inspected about 17% of properties in SRAs on average in 2018 – about half of its goal of 33%. Some CAL
FIRE units inspected fewer than 10% of applicable properties annually.”).
136. Id.
137. See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 2 (outlining that nine of the top ten most destructive California
wildfires have occurred since 2003).
138. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (highlighting that land use
regulations “must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare”).
139. See id. at 388 (assessing land use regulations in the context of nuisance law, noting that states may
regulate property owners “by considering [the land or use] in connection with the circumstances and the locality.
A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard”).
140. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
141. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (including, explicitly, development of residential
dwellings in the prohibition).
142. William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36 ENVTL. L. 105, 127
(2006).
143. Charlie Ban, A Year After the Camp Fire, Rebuilding Remains a Challenge, NAT’L ASS’N OF
COUNTIES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.naco.org/articles/year-after-camp-fire-rebuilding-remains-challenge (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
144. See id. (quoting Chico Supervisor Deborah Lucero, stating: “If you had a house [in Chico, California]
that was worth $300,000 on Nov. 7, on Nov. 8 [the date of the Camp Fire] it was worth $100,000 more . . . .
(Available) housing was so tight before this. Now it’s almost nonexistent”).
145. Id.

357

2021 / Land Development Ban Will Hinder Solutions to the Wildfire Crisis
Meanwhile, properties struck by wildfires under SB 474 would have
experienced property value decline as landowners often sell such vacant WUI
parcels to aspiring developers and home builders. 146 Federal research has already
shown that property values in a region decline after only one wildfire strikes.147 It
stands to reason that no potential buyers would have seen value in a high-risk
parcel that could no longer be developed.148 And with California’s already
significant housing shortage, development is how landowners derive value from
vacant parcels across the state. 149 This development, done wisely, is precisely what
California needs right now.150 Without it, the “economic impact” on many
landowners who cannot develop their properties will be debilitating. 151
The second factor of the Penn Central test assesses the claimant’s
“investment-backed expectations.”152 Many Californian’s who purchase rural land
intend on utilizing that land for home-building.153 These landowners are fully
aware of their land’s status as high-risk but accept that risk given the perceived
benefits of rural living.154 Furthermore, land in California is expensive, and
purchasers expect their land to compensate them for the cost—whether in housing,
recreation, farming, or resource extraction.155
146. See Ross Kendall & Peter Tulip, The Effect of Zoning on Housing Prices, CATO INST. (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/publications/research-briefs-economic-policy/effect-zoning-housing-prices (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (arguing that land use regulation increases housing costs as people are
forced to compete for the remaining non-regulated lands); see also Jaeger, supra note 142, at 127 (illustrating
how land use restrictions can have negative effects on affected land’s market value).
147. Julie M. Mueller et al., Do Repeated Wildfires Change Homebuyers’ Demand for Homes in HighRisk Areas? A Hedonic Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Effects of Repeated Wildfires on House Prices in
Southern
California,
U.S.
FOREST
SERV.,
https://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/documents/psw_gtr227en/psw_gtr227_en070mueller.pdf (last visited on
Aug. 4, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
148. See id. (describing how high fire risk—and especially previous wildfires—have a significantly
negative impact on property values).
149. See Jeff Collins, Bill to Boost California Homebuilding Headed to Newsom’s Desk, ORANGE COUNTY
REG. (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/09/06/bill-seeking-to-boost-california-homebuildingheaded-to-newsoms-desk/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[The Housing Crisis Act of
2019] gives a green light to housing that already meets existing zoning and local rules and prevents new rules that
might limit housing we so desperately need.”) (quoting Senator Nancy Skinner, the bill’s author).
150. See id. (“Our failure to build enough housing has led to the highest rents and home ownership costs
in the nation.”) (quoting Senator Nancy Skinner, the bill’s author).
151. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
152. Id. at 123.
153. See Barrett, supra note 10, at 15 (noting that from 1990–2010, 41% of all new home-development
occurred in WUI regions).
154. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51183.5 (West 2020) (“A transferor of real property that is located within a
very high fire hazard severity zone, designated pursuant to this chapter, shall disclose to any prospective transferee
the fact that the property is located within a very high fire hazard severity zone.”); see also Cal. State Geoportal,
supra note 9 (allowing any potential land purchaser to determine if the sought after land falls within a high-risk
region).
155. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LAND VALUES, 2019 SUMMARY, (2019), available at
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/land0819.pdf (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (placing California in the most expensive category of states given its average farm real estate
value of approximately $10,000 an acre—nearly three times the national average of $3,160 per acre).
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Many landowners who have had their homes ravaged by wildfires fully expect
to rebuild their parcels—either by themselves or through a new buyer.156 Wildfires
decrease property values, creating an opportunity for “less risk-averse”
homeowners.157 Purchasers know they are buying at a reduced rate and are
cognizant of the risks but still buy expecting to build on the property.158 Therefore,
SB 474 would have negated the expectations that these purchasers—or existing
owners—had when buying their parcels in wildfire-ravaged regions.159
Finally, the third factor under Penn Central analyzes the “character of the
governmental action.”160 Given the impacts of California’s wildfire crisis in recent
decades, this action is certainly “substantially related” to a policy of the utmost
importance: preserving life and property. 161 On these grounds, the final factor
would have weighed in favor of SB 474’s validity. 162 However, this factor is not
dispositive, so courts would have likely found that many affected landowners had
suffered a taking and required the state to pay “just compensation.” 163
3. The Lucas Test: “Loss of all Economically Beneficial Use”
SB 474 was strikingly similar to the development ban from the Lucas case—
where the Court found a taking—and likely would have subjected the state to
litigation.164 The bill would have imposed a ban on “residential . . . , commercial,
retail, [and] industrial use,” due to the exigencies of wildfire. 165 Given the
applicability of the ban to almost any form of economically productive use of land,
nearly all private sectors would have opposed its enactment. 166
Landowners who had purchased land to build a home or business would have
found that, under SB 474, their parcels had suddenly become “valueless.” 167

156. See Hannigan, supra note 55, at 31–32 (explaining the cycle of “homebuilding, wildfire, rebuilding,
wildfire” being the norm in California).
157. Mueller, et al., supra note 147.
158. See id. (discussing the role of fear and human perception in property value decline after a wildfire,
which brings in less “risk-averse” buyers).
159. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (declaring this broad development ban which, as
discussed, prohibits virtually any development whatsoever).
160. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
161. See id. at 138 (finding city residents aesthetic enjoyment of a historical landmark to be a valid public
interest, justifying a land use regulation); supra Part I (conceding wildfire’s significant, deleterious effects on the
health, safety, livelihoods, and property of millions of Californians).
162. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (providing that local ordinances
designed to protect public health, safety, and welfare are presumptively valid).
163. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (explaining that review of such actions requires “ad-hoc, factual
inquiries”).
164. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992) (analyzing the constitutional validity
of a law that prohibited development near beaches on the South Carolina coast experiencing erosion).
165. SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
166. See id. (prohibiting not only residential development, but also “commercial, retail, or industrial” uses).
167. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006 (describing the complete moratorium on development—akin to SB 474—
which the Court found to be a taking).

359

2021 / Land Development Ban Will Hinder Solutions to the Wildfire Crisis
Further, much of California’s high-risk land is in the WUI, meaning remote, rural,
and often underserved by utilities or commercial presence. 168 It is difficult to see a
practical alternate use for rural land that could mitigate an endeavoring home or
business owner’s financial loss.169 The development ban would have also impacted
communities seeking to rebuild after a wildfire.170 Meanwhile, cities like Paradise
often promulgate significantly more rigid building codes in response to wildfire.171
Among other difficulties, these stringent codes have an inhibiting effect on the
ability of landowners to rebuild their homes.172 Thus, SB 474 would have only
made the situation worse.173
Further, SB 474 barred retail, industrial, or commercial interests from
establishing themselves to serve communities trying to rebuild.174 For example,
utility companies would have been unable to install new power lines in such rural,
underserved communities.175 Moreover, the ban would have barred other basic
services—such as grocery stores, gas stations, pharmacies, and hospitals—as many
still need to rebuild.176 SB 474’s real effect would have been consigning towns like
Paradise to a status of non-existence.177 And the Legislature cannot ignore the fact
that California will continue to burn in these WUI regions, while SB 474 would
have barred all conscientious reconstruction.178 Further, SB 474 would have
decreased the amount of inhabitable land in the state and increased housing
costs.179 Finally, SB 474 would have also resulted in a bevy of claimants pursuing
168. See Stephen R. Miller, Planning for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban Interface: A Guide for Western
Communities, 49 URB. L. 207, 208, 210 (2017) (describing the WUI as the areas “where humans and their
development meet or intermix with wildland fuel”).
169. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (“[B]y requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state—[carries]
a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm.”).
170. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (banning all necessary development after a massive
wildfire, including, residential, commercial, retail, or industrial projects).
171. See Kirk Siegler, The Camp Fire Destroyed 11,000 Homes, A Year Later Only 11 Have Been Rebuilt,
NPR (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/09/777801169/the-camp-fire-destroyed-11-000-homes-ayear-later-only-11-have-been-rebuilt (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[T]he town has
passed some new, tougher building codes. That includes no more wood decks or fences and expanded setbacks
between homes and flammable material. They’re also looking to reconfigure some streets for better escape routes.
Some people died while trying to evacuate in the gridlock.”).
172. Id.
173. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (prohibiting all essential development for long term
habitation of a scorched region).
174. See id. (seeking to create a bar to any development which would have applied to most regions recently
ravaged by wildfires).
175. See id. (prohibiting any commercial or industrial development, surely meant to include construction
of new power lines).
176. See id. (barring all such building projects, explicitly).
177. See id. (preventing all building projects in the town of Paradise, as the Board has now entirely
classified Paradise as high fire risk).
178. See Meyer, supra note 12 (noting that the effects of long-embraced suppression policies—increasing
quantities of easily burnable fuels—and climate change are exacerbating the current crisis and will continue to
breed more intense fires).
179. See JOHN LOCKE, CONSEQUENCES OF LOWERING INTEREST, Part 3 (1691) (“The rising and falling of
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“just compensation” for the loss of all “economically viable use” of their
properties.180
C. The Reality: What A Dose of Prevention May Be Worth in an Era of
Suppression
The motivation behind SB 474 is certainly rational given the increase in
demands for fire suppression.181 In the event of a wildfire, Cal Fire’s general policy
is to respond immediately and limit all spread. 182 Cal Fire’s budget clearly
delineates between “normal, day-to-day” costs—like prevention—and emergency
fire suppression costs.183 Estimated suppression costs in 2004–2005 totaled over
75% of Cal Fire’s budget.184 These numbers have only increased in recent years. 185
By the 2017–2018 fire season, Cal Fire’s emergency expenditures alone reached
an estimated $773 million—nearly a ten-fold increase since 2010, taking into
account inflation.186 Yet, one scholar noted that “attempting to extinguish all
wildfires is costly, dangerous, and unrealistic.”187
Recent estimates indicate that Cal Fire spends over 40% of its budget on
wildland fire suppression—and the smallest totals go toward prevention.188
Preemptory fire preparedness receives the least agency funding by category and,
as illustrated by the many failed fire prevention bills, often fails to gain traction
politically.189 While the state must play a pivotal role in wildfire management, its
myopic focus on suppression and banning development comes at the cost of other
real solutions.190
the Price of Land, as of other things, depends much on the quantity of Land, set to Sale.”).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); see Hannigan,
supra note 55, at 39–40 (arguing that a development prohibition is a virtual non-starter given private property and
Takings Clause jurisprudence in the United States).
181. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (noting that fire prevention and suppression on SRAs
are primarily the financial responsibility of the state).
182. GIAMBATTISTA, supra note 11, at 4.
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id. at 9.
185. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROTECTION, supra note 46.
186. See Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (showing an inflation rate increase of approximately 14.1% over the years between 2010–
2018); see also CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROTECTION, supra note 46 (showing emergency suppression
expenditures from 2010–2011 equaling $90.1 million).
187. Barrett, supra note 10, at 27.
188. See GIAMBATTISTA, supra note 11, at 8–9 (highlighting that for the past ten years these costs have
consistently increased ten percent annually and showing that the smallest total expenditure by program area is
“prevention”).
189. Id. at 8; see infra Subsections IV.D.1, IV.D.2 (discussing the failed preemptory fire preparedness bills
AB 1516 and SB 739).
190. See California Burning: Episode 1: Our History With Fire, PODCAST & PUB. RADIO SERIES (Sept.
29, 2019), https://www.californiaburning.net/ (downloaded using Overcast) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (highlighting the over-reliance on suppression and ignoring the benefits of utilizing fire—
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The unfortunate reality is that suppression has been the main goal of
California’s wildfire policy for over a century.191 As recent decades have shown,
agencies must revisit California’s wildfire policy as people continue flocking to
the WUI.192 WUI regions are constantly evolving—as what was once rural,
undeveloped wildland in many areas is now fully urban—and require continuous
alteration of wildfire policy.193 Therefore, agencies must regularly update land use
and planning regulations to reflect the needs of the changing landscape of human
presence and wildfire.194
Moreover, many prevention efforts center around informal voluntary
educational programs that help participants to more adequately prepare for
potential wildfire. 195 These prevention measures co-opt the efforts and passion of
citizens most directly affected by wildfires. 196 This education—especially if the
Legislature were to pair it with more adequate funding—could very likely prevent
the destruction to homes and businesses like TurkeyTail Farms. 197 Also, the state
could direct some funding toward subsidies for homes constructed with fireresistant materials and thereby reduce the long-term need for large scale
suppression strategies. 198
SB 474 indicated the Legislature’s shift away from nuanced solutions and
toward the conclusion that the exigencies of wildfire require more simple,
prohibitive measures.199 The ban on development—despite property owners’ fire
preparedness—was a broad injunction that lacked nuance and ignored the most

to fight fire).
191. See id. (“[T]he agenda was to remove fire as fully as possible from the landscape. This was academic
forestry’s argument. The more fire you could take out, the better everything would be.”).
192. See California Burning: Episode 4: The Wildland-Urban Interface, PODCAST & PUB. RADIO SERIES
(Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.californiaburning.net/ (downloaded using Overcast) (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting other objectives which communities and agencies must consider, such as:
(1) forest and vegetation management; (2) streets with multiple escape routes; (3) fire-resistant homes; (4)
defensible space).
193. See Miller, supra note 168, at 208, 210 (“[I]t is important to recognize that the WUI is not a stagnant
concept; rather, as a community develops, the WUI will change.”).
194. See id. (“WUI wildfire planning must be updated to reflect the changes in a community’s urbanization,
even if all other factors remain the same.”).
195. AB 1516, 2019 Leg., 2018–2019 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as passed on Sept. 10, 2019, but vetoed by
Governor); SB 739, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Jan. 15, 2020, but not enacted).
196. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (noting that the program would likely “effectively leverage
and target the limited resources of Cal Fire and other local agencies to perform regulatory inspections while
ensuring consistent standards are used statewide”).
197. See Tchudi, supra note 1 (noting that the locally provided training programs, to date, have
prohibitively expensive costs for entry for many local residents).
198. See PODCAST & PUB. RADIO SERIES, supra note 192 (“What we’ve been doing is working with our
partners for our Community Wildfire Protection Plan. So, we bring together a bunch of partners and then design
where do the projects need to take place. Where there is the most critical risk to fire danger in the communities.
And then we wait for the right grant to come, and if it will fund fuels reduction or watershed health or forest
thinning.”) (quoting Calli-Jane DeAnda, Executive Director of the Butte County Fire Safe Council).
199. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (signaling the move from voluntary training and
education of Californians to an outright “development prohibition”).

362

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
basic prevention strategies. 200 The ban also failed to adequately capture the unique
needs of different cities, communities, and individuals.201 Further, the ban failed to
address existing structures in the WUI, whose owners often lack the resources or
knowledge to properly prepare for fire. 202 SB 474 would have left existing
homeowners in harm’s way, potentially unable to update their homes with firesafe
materials.203
In addition, this development ban would have disincentivized landowner
presence on vacant WUI parcels—reducing vegetation removal and other fire
prevention efforts—allowing for unmitigated, dangerous vegetation growth.204
These unintended effects would have left large sectors of the state dormant,
significantly increasing fire-risk to neighboring properties containing homes and
other structures.205 SB 474 undermined its own purported goals by ignoring
essential fire prevention, leaving homeowners at heightened risk, and seemed to
be a response only to out-of-control suppression costs.206
D. Practical Considerations: Other Measures Can Have Real Positive Effect for
Individual Californians Facing Wildfire Risk
Fire prevention bills like AB 1516 and SB 739 sought to impose minimal
regulatory hurdles, increase community buy-in, and raise awareness on wildfire
preparedness while respecting private property rights.207 In his veto message for
AB 1516, Governor Newsom wrote: “[E]ach community is different and the best
practices to achieve resiliency need to be crafted to meet the individual needs of
that community. This bill takes a broad swath approach that does not reflect those
individual needs.”208 Governor Newsom’s justified aversion to overly broad
200. See id. (removing locality’s powers to regulate land development in high risk regions and SRAs); see
SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (highlighting home hardening, prevention training, and clearance
requirements as among the most essential tools for combating wildfire destruction to homes).
201. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (citing Governor Newsom’s objection to a “broad swath
approach”).
202. See Tchudi, supra note 1 (stating that many of his properties’ trees and neighbors’ homes were
virtually untouched by the Camp Fire—including his parents’ home, which still stands on TurkeyTail Farms).
203. See supra Section IV.A (arguing that prohibiting conscientious development will only exacerbate the
wildfire crisis by leaving outdated, high fire risk homes unaddressed).
204. See supra Section IV.B (inferring that with no economically viable use for WUI parcels, landowner’s
will be less inclined to maintain them).
205. See Thomas Curwen & Joseph Serna, The Camp Fire Burned Down Homes But Left Trees Standing:
The Science Behind the Fire’s Path, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/california/lame-camp-fire-lessons-20181120-story.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that
the defensible space requirement “stops at the property line which creates a situation where homes can be built
beside one another within that [100 foot] perimeter” and other key factors which contributed to the fire’s spread,
such as: (1) flammable roofs; (2) vegetation around structures; and (3) rain gutters choked with leaves and
needles).
206. See id. (showing the lingering risks in towns like Paradise that would have persisted despite SB 474).
207. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (seeking to create voluntary fire preparedness and training
programs for WUI regions with low inspection compliance ratings).
208. SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (emphasis added).
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legislation was a response to a bill that merely imposed regulatory updates to
vegetation clearance and defensible space requirements.209
SB 474 went far beyond such piecemeal, mitigatory regulation and constituted
a ban on development with many compounding effects. 210 Subsection 1 introduces
the vetoed AB 1516.211 Subsection 2 discusses the more narrowly tailored, and
similarly failed, SB 739.212
1. The Failed AB 1516—Fire Prevention: Defensible Space and Fuels
Reduction Management
AB 1516 required state agencies and local governments to improve community
safety, response, and fire prevention training. 213 The failed AB 1516 did create
“more intense fuel reduction” obligations on landowners but also provided funding
to adequately perform this work on their properties.214 SB 474 provided no funding
for existing structures and would have unnecessarily—and unproductively—
increased state costs by having to pay compensation to many landowners. 215 The
funding component is pivotal for certain localities’ fire preparedness—or lack
thereof—given wealth differentials. 216 Reports from local agencies indicate higher
income counties experience the highest rates of annual inspections—“up to 100%
of applicable homes.”217 These wealthier, coastal counties are mostly urban or
suburban and are the most prepared and protected. 218 SB 474 would have had a
disproportionate effect on lower wealth regions of California by barring
development on land with already lower market values and lower inspection

209. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (imposing no additional regulatory hurdles for local
governments or landowners).
210. See supra Sections IV.A–C (highlighting the ways in which this bill would have, in fact, likely
increased both state costs and the intensity of WUI burns).
211. Infra Subsection IV.D.1.
212. Infra Subsection IV.D.2.
213. AB 1516, 2019 Leg., 2018–2019 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as passed on Sept. 10, 2019, but vetoed by
Governor).
214. See AB 1516, 2019 Leg., 2018–2019 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as passed on Sept. 10, 2019, but vetoed by
Governor) (“This bill would require a person described above to utilize more intense fuel reductions between 5
and 30 feet around the structure, and to create an ember-resistant zone within 5 feet of the structure, as provided.”).
215. See supra Subsections IV.B.2–3 (discussing the constitutional provisions which would have required
the State of California to pay “just compensation” to many affected landowners).
216. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S GEOGRAPHY OF WEALTH 6, 8–9, 13 (Sept.
2019), available at https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2019/4093/ca-geography-wealth-090519.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (outlining that California’s wealthiest counties are located on the Coast,
typically more densely populated urban centers); Tchudi, supra note 1 (arguing that the financial cost of fire
prevention training programs is a bar to entry for many Butte County residents).
217. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (listing those counties as: (1) Ventura; (2) Los Angeles; (3)
Santa Barbara; and (4) Orange).
218. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 216, at 8; see SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78
(noting the resident homeowners with the highest rates of fire preparedness inspection compliance being those
located in wealthy coastal counties); see also INS. INFO. INST., supra note 2 (showing that six of the ten costliest
fires in California history were in rural, less wealthy counties).
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rates.219
2. The Abandoned SB 739—Fire Prevention: Defensible Space and Home
Hardening Training
SB 739 recognized the limitations of state agencies toward wildfire prevention
by empowering localities and individuals to rise to the challenge of fire
prevention.220 This bill was a more narrow redrafting of AB 1516 and included
only its least onerous provision: a fire prevention training program. 221 Even this
bill failed, again reinforcing some legislator’s full embrace of suppression as the
chief means of wildfire management. 222 Thereafter, SB 474 had a singular focus:
the prohibition of all building on high-risk properties. 223 But as recent prevention
bill failures—and consideration of SB 474—indicate, some in the Legislature
overlook landowners and their existing structures in favor of a “broad swath
approach.”224
V. CONCLUSION
Proper fire protection requires striking a balance akin to what California’s state
and local agencies have worked towards for nearly a century. 225 This balance must
weigh the costs and benefits of both suppression and prevention.226 While a
development ban is arguably a means to serve both ends, the conclusion that all
development on high-risk land is unwise proves too much.227 In so doing, SB 474
opens the state to potential litigation costs, undermines local agency autonomy,
and fails to address lingering risks.228 Furthermore, other failed measures—while

219. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (noting that local agencies “perform defensible space
inspections of homes at a higher rate in local responsibility areas” and these do not tend to be rural, lower-income
counties lacking the funding and resources).
220. SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78.
221. See SB 739 Nat. Res. Hearing, supra note 135 (discussing Governor Newsom’s “broad swath”
objection to AB 1516 given its additional regulatory hurdles for local agencies and Cal Fire, whereas, SB 739
only sought to create an optional training program).
222. See supra Section IV.C (highlighting the massive increases in emergency suppression costs since
2000).
223. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“a new development shall not be created or approved
in a very high fire hazard severity zone or a state responsibility area.”).
224. SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78.
225. See supra Section II.C (describing the tandem nature of state and local governmental wildfire
preparedness and suppression regulations).
226. See supra Section IV.C (discussing the essential roles of both prevention and suppression in a
comprehensive wildfire preparedness schema).
227. See supra Part IV (arguing that a land development ban is unwise for constitutional, practical, and
policy reasons).
228. See supra Part IV (outlining the Takings Clause implications, federalism concerns, and negative
practical impacts of such sweeping legislation).
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none a panacea—provided more nuanced solutions.229 Fire prevention bills like
AB 1516 and SB 739 would have reinforced property rights while ensuring
minimum safeguards remained in place to protect landowners and their
neighbors.230 And for landowners like Christopher at TurkeyTail Farms, these bills
could have co-opted local resources and captured local passion in preparation for
wildfire.231
SB 474 conveyed the message that the Legislature was trying to find the easy
way out.232 Merely holding the status quo on this multi-faceted problem would not
have addressed persisting risks nor garnered many future rewards. 233 State
government often defaults to broad legislation to solve perceived statewide
problems, but many of the challenges are inherently local with wildfire.234 The less
traveled route may be the wiser choice here, empowering individuals and local
entities to strengthen their communities—paired with resources, education, and
funding.235 California’s nuanced wildfire problem requires similarly nuanced
solutions, and SB 474 would have created more difficulties than it resolved. 236

229. See supra Section IV.D (supporting the more piecemeal, nuanced approaches offered by wildfire
preparedness bills like AB 1516 and SB 739).
230. SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78.
231. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (noting that “expanding community opportunities to protect
our neighborhoods” will “support and augment” Cal Fire who is “often not equipped with the support necessary
from the state” to accomplish proper preparedness).
232. See supra Section IV.C (describing the current wildfire crisis’ significant impact on annual state
budgets).
233. SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78; see supra Part IV.B (highlighting persistent risks like existing
structures and vacant parcels and how SB 474 would have left them at heightened risk).
234. See SB 739 Rules Hearing, supra note 78 (citing Governor Newsom’s objection to a “broad swath
approach”) (“[E]ach community is different and the best practices to achieve resiliency need to be crafted to meet
the individual needs of that community.”); supra Section IV.A (discussing local government’s essential role in a
comprehensive wildfire preparedness regime).
235. See supra Section IV.A (arguing that SB 474 would have crippled local government’s ability to help
their residents prepare, modernize, and rebuild).
236. See supra Part IV (outlining the constitutional, practical, and policy challenges that a development
ban would have created, and the better impact more nuanced, piecemeal legislation could have on California’s
wildfire crisis).
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